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Vicarious Liability For Volunteers: Should
Missouri Courts Consider New Standards?
Woods v. Kelley'
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem tort law clearly requires employers to recognize and confront issues
of vicarious liability for the negligence of their employees. Employers,
however, may be more uncertain as to their exposure to liability for the
negligence of their volunteers, as volunteers often decide the time, place, and
manner in which they serve an organization.
Nonetheless, volunteers also receive suggestions, advice, or directions from
those who oversee the organization's daily operations. Volunteers may also
utilize the organization's materials and equipment and are sometimes reimbursed
for materials they purchase for the organization. For purposes of vicarious
liability, will these volunteers be categorized as independent contractors,
employees of the organization, or something else?
Woods v. Kelley provides a prime opportunity to examine this issue in the
context of a city's vicarious liability for the actions of a volunteer. The Kelley
court discusses the circumstances under which a volunteer will be more like an
independent contractor than a servant or employee. Although the court adopts
no conclusive test for all volunteers, Kelley does provide guidance for future
cases.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 11, 1993, Max Woods was killed in an automobile collision
in Grandview, Missouri.2 His wife, Margie Woods, was injured in the same
accident. The driver of the other automobile involved in the accident, Catherine
Kelley, had gone to a nursery to pick up some trees to plant at Shelton House,4
an historic home owned by the City of Grandview.
Kelley volunteered at Shelton House and served as a member of the
Grandview Board of Aldermen.6 Although the City of Grandview was aware of
her volunteer efforts, Kelley often did not inform the city as to the nature of her
1. 948 S.W.2d 634 (Mo Ct. App. 1997).
2. Id. at 635.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 636. However, Kelley was unable to pick up the trees because the nursery
was closed. Id.
5. Id. at 635.
6. Id. at 636. Kelley's volunteer efforts included landscaping and maintenance
services. Id.
1
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services.7 The City neither paid Kelley for her work nor expected her to perform
work.8 Nonetheless, the City occasionally reimbursed Kelley for her expenses,
although she did not always submit expenses for reimbursement.9 Kelley
worked at Shelton House, independently of the city employees, without
instruction or supervision.'0
Max Woods' surviving children, Kimberly and Derek Woods, filed a
wrongful death action against Kelley." Mrs. Woods also filed a claim for
personal injuries. 12 The plaintiffs eventually settled their claims against Kelley
and dropped her from the lawsuit.13 However, they amended their petition to
include the City of Grandview as a defendant. 14
In naming Grandview as a defendant, the plaintiffs asserted that Kelley was
a "public employee" so as to invoke Missouri Revised Statute Section
537.600.1(1), which provides for waiver of sovereign immunity in certain
circumstances.' 5 The plaintiffs also pursued a common law negligence claim
against the City under the doctrine of vicarious liability.' 6 To establish the
requisite "right to control" under both the statutory and common law claims, the
plaintiffs argued that the City of Grandview clearly exercised and had the right
to exercise ultimate control over Kelley's activities at Shelton House,
specifically, those relating to maintenance and landscaping. 7 In support of their
position, the Woods pointed to the City's ability to disapprove Kelley's
expenditures, to refuse her volunteer services on a particular project, and to deny
Kelley's services altogether. 18 The City of Grandview filed a motion for
summary judgment and the Woods filed a motion for partial summary
judgment.19 The Circuit Court of Jackson County granted summary judgment
in favor of the City of Grandview, holding that the undisputed facts established
that Kelley was not a "public employee" under Section 537.600, and that the




10. Id. Kelley also had her own key to the premises. Id.




15. Id. at 636-37. Missouri provides for sovereign immunity as existed at common
law prior to September 12, 1977, except in cases of "[i]njuries directly resulting from the
negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor
vehicles or motorized vehicles within the course of their employment." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.600.1(1) (1994).
16. Woods v. Kelley, 948 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo Ct. App. 1997).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 635.
20. Id. at 636.
[Vol. 63
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. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District affirmed the
decision of the lower court. 2' The court held that a volunteer is not a public
employee when the city does not control the method, manner, or means of the
volunteer's services.22 Furthermore, the court held that a city cannot be held
liable for actions of a volunteer under common law theories of negligence, even
with a statute waiving sovereign immunity, when the volunteer is not a public




Missouri Revised Statute Section 537.600 reveals that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity remains in "full force and effect" in Missouri, shielding the
sovereign from liability for negligent acts of its employees.2 4 However, to soften
the harsh effects of the doctrine, Section 537.600.1 provides for an absolute
waiver of immunity for injuries borne out of the operation of motor or motorized
vehicles by "public employees., 2' To determine whether a volunteer fits within
the definition of a public employee, Missouri applies the traditional common law
doctrine of vicarious liability.
26
A. Vicarious Liability for Employees
Missouri courts have traditionally applied the widely adopted "control
approach" to determine whether the relationship of master-servant exists.27 This
approach examines whether the alleged master had the right to control the
physical conduct of the other person.28 Without a right to control, the alleged
21. Id. at 638.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.1 (1994).
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.1(1) (1994); see Woods v. Kelley, 948 S.W.2d 634,
637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
26. Woods, 948 S.W.2d at 637. When searching for the meaning of "public
employee" under Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.1(1) (1994), courts must "look to the
traditional common law doctrine of vicarious liability, and its attendant definitions of
master and servant" so as not to neglect the compensatory purpose of the statute.
Bowman v. State, 763 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
27. See Dean v. Young, 396 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Mo. 1965) ("This element, control
or right to control, is the element most frequently referred to in our cases distinguishing
a servant from an independent contractor."); Gardner v. Simmons, 370 S.W.2d 359, 362
(Mo. 1963); Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 166 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Mo. 1942); Woods,
948 S.W.2d at 637; Wilson v. St. Louis Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 845 S.W.2d
568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Bowman, 763 S.W.2d at 163; Usrey v. Dr. Pepper Bottling
Co., 385 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
28. Woods, 948 S.W.2d at 637 (citing Balderas v. Howe, 891 S.W.2d 871, 873-74
1998]
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servant is an independent contractor.29 However, no one test is conclusive as to
the master's "right to control. 30
Some Missouri cases look to the Restatement (Second) of Agency Section
220 to determine whether one acting for another is a servant.3 1 The Restatement
lists the following factors:
a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work; b) whether or not the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation of business; c) the kind
of operation with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision; d) the skill required in the particular occupation; e)
whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; f) the
length of time for which the person is employed; g) the method of
payment, whether by time or by job; h) whether or not the work is part
of the regular business of the employer; i) whether or not the parties
believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant; and j)
whether the principal is or is not in business. 2
Although the Restatement factors should be considered, "[t]he determining
factor is not whether [the alleged master] actually exercised control over the
work. . . but whether [the alleged master] had the right to exercise that
control.,
33
In Carter v. Wright,3 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a worker was
an "employee" under a theory of respondeat superior.35  The worker's
negligence occurred while the employee was hauling sheetrock for his
employer.36 The court examined the factors in the Restatement (Second) of
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995)).
29. Hougland v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 939 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
30. Woods v. Kelley, 948 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); see Sharp v. W.
& W. Trucking Co., 421 S.W.2d 213, 220 (Mo. 1967) (citing Gardner v. Simmons, 370
S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo. 1963)); Cloninger v. Wolfe, 477 S.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (stating that "no one of the sundry elements which enter into a determination
of the actual master-servant relationship is alone conclusive, and all must be viewed to
see whether control, or a right of control has been retained over the alleged servant's
physical conduct and details of the work").
31. Carter v. Wright, 949 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Ferguson v. Pony
Express Courier Corp., 898 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Pratt v. Reed &
Brown Hauling Co., 361 S.W.2d 57, 62-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
33. Pratt, 361 S.W.2d at 63.
34. 949 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/7
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR VOLUNTEERS
Agency Section 220 and found that the employer had a right to control the
actions of his employee. The right to control was established because the
employer chose the dumpsite, gave the employee directions as to its location,
supervised and worked with the employee, and the worker obeyed the
employer.38 The court also found the worker was not engaged in a distinct
occupation, was paid by the hour, regularly worked for the employer, routinely
took orders from the employer's supervisor, and that the work required a
minimal degree of skill.39
In Archer v. Outboard Marine Corp.,40 the Missouri Court of Appeals
looked to whether the person sought to be charged as master had the right or
power to control and direct the physical conduct of the servant. However, this
case emphasized the quality of the control exerted by the alleged master over the
servant. The court examined whether the right to control was "complete and
unqualified," including control over the details of performance,4' and held that
a fishing tournament sponsor had not exercised sufficient control over a fishing
toumament to render it vicariously liable for the death of a tournament
contestant.42 The plaintiffs proved that the sponsor exerted enough influence
over the tournament to require implementation of safety requirements.43
However, the court found that "the undisputed evidence establishe[d]" that the
exerted influence was not based upon a right to control, but by "negotiation and
persuasion.'A In other words, if the association hosting the tournament and its
director had chosen to resist, the sponsor "would not have been able to exert its
influence., 45 Only the association and its director had the authority to run,
direct, and supervise the tournament; the director chose the sites, rules, and
details.4
6
Missouri case law indicates that Missouri courts use the "right to control"
test to determine issues of vicarious liability and the Restatement factors provide
helpful guidance in making these determinations. The findings of vicarious
liability arise most frequently in cases concerning persons who were clearly paid
employees, but such determinations become more elusive when unpaid
volunteers, rather than traditional employees, are the negligent actors.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 160.
39. Id. at 161-62.
40. 908 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
41. Id. at 703.
42. Id. at 701-02.
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B. Vicarious Liability for Volunteers
As with paid employees, Missouri recognizes that one who volunteers
services47 may create liability for a person or organization that' accepts the
volunteer's services.48 Like the traditional findings of a master-servant
relationship, determination of liability lies in the right of the master to control
the acts of the servant.49 The requisite master-servant relationship is established
when the alleged master "has the right to direct the method by which the
master's service is performed."50
In Wilson v. St. Louis Area Council Boy Scouts ofArmerica,5' the Missouri
Court of Appeals held that adult volunteer Boy Scout troop leaders were not
servants or agents of the Boy Scouts of America when a member of a Boy Scout
troop was killed on a trip to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.52 The court reasoned
that the structure of the organization was such that the troop and its leaders were
not required to get permission from the local council before participating in its
activities. 3 The council neither ordered nor directed the troop or its leaders to
go to Fort Leonard Wood, nor did the council know of the troop's excursion. 4
Like Missouri, other jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of respondeat
superior for the torts of unpaid volunteers and take the position expressed in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 225 that "one who volunteers services
without an agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of the one
accepting such services."55 The comments to the Restatement further clarify the
rule, stating that the consent of the master, or the manifestation of consent, is
required before the master-servant relationship is established.5 6  Most
47. "Volunteer" is defined as:
[O]ne who enters into service of his own free will; one who gives his services
without any express or implied promise of remuneration; one who has no
interest in the work, but nevertheless undertakes to assist therein; one who
merely offers his services on his own free will, as opposed to one who is
conscripted.
Bond v. Cartwright Little League, Inc. 536 P.2d 697, 702 (Ariz. 1975).
48. Wilson v. St. Louis Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 845 S.W.2d 568, 571
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Allan Manley, Annotation, Liability of Charitable
Organization Under Respondeat Superior Doctrine for Tort of Unpaid Volunteer, 82
A.L.R.3d 1213, 1216 (1978)).
49. Id.
50. Woods v. Kelley, 948 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wilson, 845
S.W.2d at 570-71).
51. 845 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
52. Id. at 571.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Manley, supra note 48, at 1216 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 225 (1958)).
56. See Manley, supra note 48, at 1216 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
[Vol. 63
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jurisdictions also require that a charitable organization have the right to control
the activities of its volunteers before finding a master-servant relationship. 7
In Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, an Arizona
Court of Appeals determined that a nonprofit organization, the Scottsdale
Jaycees, was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the death
and injuries sustained by passengers in an automobile accident."9 The accident
occurred while a delegate board member and his passengers were traveling to a
board meeting. 9 The court questioned whether volunteers were servants or
agents for a principal, 60 and determined that a volunteer who "consents or
manifests consent to the existence of the relation by the person for whom the
service is performed" may be a servant or agent for a principal. 61 The court also
noted that a right to control is the necessary element in a master-servant
relationship.62 The Scottsdale Jaycees did consent to Cox acting as a volunteer
delegate to the board meeting,63 and until Cox arrived at the meeting and
proceeded to exercise his duties as a delegate, the Jaycees could not exercise
control over him.6 Thus, the master-servant relationship did not exist while the
member was merely traveling to the meeting.65
Other courts also apply a "right to control" test to decide whether a master-
servant relationship exists, but the question of liability does not ultimately
depend on the right to direct the method by which the master's service is
performed.6 In Whetstone v. Dixon,67 Dixon, a deacon of the Faith and Truth
Baptist Church, drove his own truck to pick up materials to use in remodeling
the church.6 While en route to obtain the materials, Dixon collided with another
vehicle.6 9 Although the Louisiana Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the trial
§ 225 cmt. c (1958)).
57. See Evans v. Ohio State Univ., 680 N.E.2d 161, 174 (D. Ohio 1996); Manley,
supra note 48, at 1221.
58. 499 P.2d 185 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 188.
61. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 cmt. c (1958)).
62. Id. at 189.
63. Id. at 188.
64. Id. at 189.
65. Id.
66. See El Paso Laundry Co., v. Gonzales, 36 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) (holding that the "the relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer
retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the
result to be accomplished .... Inasmuch as the right to control involves the power to
discharge, the existence of the power to discharge is essential, and is an indicium of the
relation").
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court and found the church vicariously liable,70 it looked to the same factors as
the trial court did in reaching the decision. The court stated that whether a
volunteer is a servant depends on the following: (1) whether the volunteer
receives compensation; (2) the volunteer's status within the organization; (3) the
volunteer's "specific mission;" (4) whether the relationship between the alleged
servant and master is "intense;" (5) the extent of the alleged master's control
over the volunteer; and (6) the role of the organization in conferring authority
and exercising control over the volunteer and the direct benefit to the
association.7'
According to the court, Dixon was "more than a casual volunteer;"72 he
assumed ongoing responsibilities for the church, and the church continued to
delegate duties to him.73 As a deacon, Dixon was closer to "executive status"
than regular church membership.74 On the day of the collision, Dixon made the
trip at the request of the Board of Deacons, who designated the places to obtain
the remodeling materials and the time by which delivery was expected.75
Furthermore, the remodeling project was not an ordinary duty, but "a once in a
lifetime project, intense in nature., 76 Finally, Dixon's activities produced a
direct economic benefit to the church because the church saved money by
sending its own members to pick up the materials instead of having the materials
delivered.77
Although courts such as those in Louisiana may look to many factors in
determining when an organization or charitable institution is vicariously liable
for the actions of its volunteers, the Woods v. Kelley court made its finding of
non-liability based on the traditional "right to control" analysis.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Woods v. Kelley, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the City of
Grandview was not liable for Kelley's actions on either a statutory or common
70. Id. at 774. The court stated that "[i]f the facts presented in this case do not
support a finding of vicarious liability, then we find it difficult to imagine a situation
wherein vicarious liability could be imposed on a charitable organization for the acts of
its volunteer." Id. at 772 n.7.
71. Id. at 770; cf Doe v. Roman Catholic Church, 602 So. 2d 129, 133 (La. Ct.
App.) (holding that the right to control is determined by the following questions: "(1) the
degree to which the charity orders the volunteer to perform various services, (2) the
degree of contact between the charity and the volunteer, and (3) the structural hierarchy
of the charity"), rev'd, 606 So. 2d 524 (La. 1992)
72. Whetstone v. Dixon, 616 So. 2d 764, 771 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
73. Id. at 770.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 772.
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law basis.7" The court found that although the City controlled the landscaping
and maintenance services, knew of Kelley's services, had the right to terminate
Kelley's volunteer efforts, and could refuse Kelley's expenditures, it had only
general control over Kelley, or the type of control exercised over an independent
contractor.79
The court stated that a showing of much more specific and direct control
was needed to create a "public employee relationship."80 The plaintiff provided
no evidence that the City controlled the manner, method, and means of Kelley's
volunteer services.8" She volunteered to help with projects in which she wanted
to participate, and the City of Grandview did not regulate the amount of hours
or the dates on which she worked. 2 The City did not supervise or give
instructions as to what services Kelley should perform or where she should
83 diperform those services. Kelley did not inform the City, prior to her arrival, of
what services she would volunteer on a particular day.84 In addition, although
the City sometimes paid for Kelley's materials, she often paid for the materials
herself,85 The court concluded that the City of Grandview was not in control of
Kelley's volunteer efforts.86
As to the plaintiffs' common law claims of respondeat superior, the court
declared the Woods' contention to be "moot. 8 7 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs could not recover under the common law theory if Kelley was not a
"public employee" because Kelley could not have been operating within the
scope of her employment.88
V. COMMENT
The importance of Woods v. Kelley lies in its analysis of how the doctrine
of respondeat superior affects those who utilize the services of volunteers. The
court in Kelley conceded that the City had control over most aspects of Kelley's
volunteer services. The court found that the City of Grandview controlled
Kelley's landscaping and maintenance services, knew of Kelley's services, had
78. Woods v. Kelley, 948 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The court also
found that the city did not waive its sovereign immunity defense because Kelley did not
fall within the definition of a "public employee" under Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.1(1)
(1994). Id.
79. Id. at 637.
80. Id.
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the right to terminate Kelley's volunteer efforts, and could refuse Kelley's
expenditures.8 9 According to the court, "[t]his evidence establishes a general
type of control over Kelley ... ,90 However, the court looked beyond this
general "right to control" standard and required that the City exert "specific
control" over the activity in which Kelley was engaged at the time the
negligence occurred. This decision suggests that courts may be less willing to
impose vicarious liability for the acts of volunteers than they would be for paid
employees.
From a policy standpoint, the imposition of liability for volunteers may
cause organizations to cease using volunteers so that these organizations may
avoid liability. This result would be detrimental to society, which benefits from
volunteer work. On the other hand, the notion of burden shifting may weigh in
favor of finding liability. Organizations which benefit from volunteer services
may be in a better position to bear the risk of loss than the harmed individual.
This risk can be offset by the purchase of insurance and may be distributed
among other insured parties paying premiums in similar situations. Requiring
organizations accepting volunteer services to bear the risk of loss will encourage
organizations to better supervise their volunteers and reduce potential harms. By
making it difficult to find vicarious liability for volunteers, courts give these
organizations little incentive to protect against the negligence of their volunteers.
Missouri's rule, apparently requiring that an alleged master's control over
a volunteer's activities be "specific and direct"'" or "complete and
unqualified," 92 should be softened to impose vicarious liability on organizations
that acquiesce in receiving volunteer services. Volunteers that work for an
organization without supervision may engage in the same types of risk activities
that supervised, paid employees undertake. At least in the case of supervised,
paid employees, the threat of liability induces the employer to minimize risks to
others. If an organization can simply avoid liability by not supervising the
activities of their volunteers, society and the volunteer must absorb the costs of
the harm negligently caused by the volunteers who are acting to advance the
interests of their organizations. The court should toughen the rules of vicarious
liability by either of two routes: 1) treat volunteers like paid employees, or 2)
use multi-factor tests similar to those applied in Louisiana.93
What would the Missouri court have decided if Kelley had been paid for her
services? Under the Whetstone factors, 94 the Kelley facts could make the City's
89. Id. at 637.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 638 (citing Archer v. Outboard Marine Corp., 908 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1995)).
93. See Whetstone v. Dixon, 616 So. 2d 764, 766 (La Ct. App. 1993); Doe v.
Roman Catholic Church, 602 So. 2d 129, 133 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd, 606 So. 2d 524 (La.
1992).
94. Whetstone, 616 So. 2d at 770.
[Vol. 63
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vicarious liability a submissible jury question. The City had ultimate control
over the landscaping and maintenance services at Shelton House and could
approve and reimburse Kelley for her expenditures. 9 Furthermore, Kelley
provided a direct economic benefit to the City on the day of the accident.
The fact that a volunteer's services benefit an organization should be a
significant consideration in determining vicarious liability. When the
organization benefits from and knows of the volunteer's services, the
organization should bear the risk of injury to others. This would be a
particularly useful strategy in cases where the facts would not otherwise support
a finding of vicarious liability.
The reasons why such a finding becomes more difficult in the case of
volunteers is unclear. Arguably, the standard for finding vicarious liability
should not be more stringent for the acts of volunteers.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the moment, organizations that use volunteers should examine the
extent of their control over their volunteers to determine their risk of vicarious
liability. The solution for organizations to avoid liability may be for the
organization to exert no specific control over the acts of volunteers.
Nonetheless, future public policy considerations may prompt Missouri courts to
find vicarious liability more readily in cases involving volunteers.
ALICIA K. EMBLEY
95. Woods v. Kelley, 948 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
1998]
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